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Philanthropy and Education in Scotland 
Lindsay Paterson 
 
Abstract 
Philanthropic contributions to education have become more publicly visible in recent 
years, in Scotland as in many other places. Yet philanthropy used to be much more 
important to Scottish education than it is now. Funding from the state, from individual 
students, or from non-philanthropic commercial contracts remain far larger than any 
kind of charitable donation. The essay considers why people – now and in the past – 
have been inclined to make philanthropic contributions, and what would be required 
for there to be a truly substantial increase in philanthropy.  
Key words 
Philanthropy; education; Scotland; Thomas Chalmers; Andrew Carnegie; John 
Baillie; Christianity; welfare state. 
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Introduction 
A revealing place to start is with an anecdote.1 In 2011, the Scottish Government 
asked the present author to write a report on the scope which philanthropy might offer 
to extend the opportunities for children with exceptional talents – for example, those 
talents that are catered for by the very few specialist music schools in Scotland. The 
report duly appeared, suggesting ways in which this might be achieved (Paterson, 
2013). 
At a public event to discuss the report, the then Education Secretary in the Scottish 
Government, Michael Russell, praised philanthropists for offering ‘dynamism, fresh 
ideas and energy that could work in the interests of all of Scotland’s … young people’ 
(The Scotsman, 5 September 2013). Liz Smith, education spokesperson for the 
Scottish Conservatives, was also generously warm towards philanthropy (see also 
Smith, 2017). But the vehemence of the denunciation from the political left was – in 
good Scottish tradition – like the fiery anathemas of Covenanting preachers. Alex 
Wood, former headteacher in Wester Hailes, and a former militantly left-wing leader 
of Edinburgh Council, denounced the idea of using philanthropic money to aid 
outstanding children as insufferably elitist and a threat to comprehensive education.2 
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Professor Brian Boyd of Jordanhill teacher training college managed the vitriolic 
‘there is no place for vanity projects in our education system’ (Herald, 6 September 
2013). The teachers’ trade unions were unanimous in their scepticism, the Scottish 
Secondary Teachers’ Association following Professor Boyd in their attack: ‘this may 
give a warm glow to those doing the giving, but it is the sort of practice that goes back 
to another century’ Herald, 5 September 2013). 
Mr Russell, with a referendum to fight, decided, it might be suspected, that the 
better part of valour is discretion, and the report sank without trace.  
Exhortations to increase philanthropy in education 
Yet there is no shortage of exhortations to have more philanthropy. That many of 
these come from London may partly explain the Scottish scepticism. 
A recent leader in this respect was the Blair government, which commissioned a 
report in 2004 on philanthropic giving to universities in England. It claimed that ‘in 
striving for excellence in higher education, voluntary giving can make a significant 
difference’ (Department for Education and Skills, 2004: 5). Blair himself said in 
2012, when he was free to say what he liked, that  
 
the best philanthropy is not just about giving money but giving leadership. … It 
steps into areas Government is too fearful or too risk adverse to go. … It is 
visionary, seeing the connections, the trends, the patterns that others don’t. 
(Forbes Media, 2012) 
 
That rather eloquently captures a dominant theme – that philanthropists can be 
creative because they can take risks. The same theme may be found from the coalition 
of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, as part of the ‘Big Society’, encouraging 
giving in kind as well as money (UK Cabinet Office, 2011: 4-5).  
Exhortations of these sorts tend also to point hopefully to statistics seeming to 
show striking recent growth. Arising from that Blair-government report came the 
Matched Funding Scheme (which ran from 2008 to 2011), by which government 
offered to match other people’s giving to universities in England.  The outcome was 
that matched funding payments of more than £143 million were added to around £580 
million of giving by donors (More Partnership, 2012:18-19). In 2015-16, the amount 
that was donated to universities in the UK exceeded £1bn for first time, nearly tripled 
since 2004. This came from as many as 229,000 donors (Ross-CASE, 2017: 6; 
NatCen Social Research, 2008: 3). 
Part of the process of exhortation is creating a whole new employment category of 
professional fund-raisers. The head of that at Edinburgh University – the ‘Vice-
Principal Philanthropy and Advancement’ – illustrates the characteristic rhetoric: 
 
Edinburgh has benefited from a powerful centuries-long tradition of philanthropic 
support, which can now be pivotal in delivering the University's global research, 
educational and cultural agenda to make a difference in the world. 
(Edinburgh University, 2016) 
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So the Edinburgh University development trust in 2016 had £17.7m income, of which 
£14.8m were donations and endowments (Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, 
2017, charity number SC004307). 
Education has for ever been one of the two great charitable causes, the other being 
health (Checkland, 1980: 4), and this is true of general giving as well as of very 
wealthy giving. Among the two thirds of people across the UK who give to a charity 
each year, for the first time in 2015 since regular recording began a decade ago, 
‘children and young people’ were slightly ahead of medical research as the most 
popular cause (30%, 29%) (Charities Aid Foundation, 2016: 3), though medical 
research was still the most popular cause in Scotland (Charities Aid Foundation, 
2017a:12). Higher education has mostly been the main recipient of gifts of £1m or 
more, receiving one third of the overall value of such gifts in 2015 (Coutts, 2016:11). 
We can also find plenty of examples of well-known new philanthropists in 
Scotland. There is Tom Hunter, founder, with his wife Marion, of the Hunter 
Foundation which has the aim of encouraging self-responsibility and self-
determination (Handy and Handy, 2006: 82-88; The Independent, 16 July 2006; The 
Guardian, 2 January 2009). There is Jim McColl, founder of Newlands Junior 
College, successfully providing excellent vocational education for teenagers who are 
severely disaffected from schools (Newlands Junior College, 2017).  Or there is J. K. 
Rowling, using her wealth to end the forcible removal of children from their families 
after wars and other disasters (Rowling, 2017). 
So philanthropy is much talked about and seems to be growing, led by 
distinguished and admirable social leaders of diverse ideological hue. 
Yet, despite the enthusiasm of the professional fundraisers and the alarms from the 
Scottish political left, the actual scale of philanthropy is, relatively speaking, 
extremely modest. 229,000 individual donors sound a lot, but that is only 1.2% of of 
alumni (More Partnership, 2012: 62; the proportion of donating alumni in the USA is 
10%.). £1bn in recent charitable giving to universities also seems impressive, but the 
total income of UK universities in that year was £35bn (Higher Education Statistics 
Agency, 2016, Table 16). The £1bn also includes pledges of up to five years ahead, 
and so, annualised, the proportion is even less: 1.7% from donations and endowments 
for the UK as a whole, and a mere 0.77% in Scotland. Even if we include research 
contracts from charities that were originally set up by philanthropists (such as 
Leverhulme, Nuffield or Carnegie), these percentages rise to only 5.3% and 5% 
respectively. Whether we should include such charities may be disputed, since they 
are not themselves philanthropists: they were, rather, the recipients of philanthropy a 
century or more ago, and now operate, in effect, like the research councils or other 
funders of specific research projects. 
Similar points may be made about individual universities. Edinburgh University is 
the second-largest educational charity in Scotland. Its income in 2016 was £906m. 
But the donations and legacies much praised by its alumni office were a mere £21.2m, 
which is 2.3% (Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, 2017, charity number 
SC005336). Even adding in the activities of the University’s Development Trust takes 
that percentage to just 3.9% (Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, 2017, charity 
number SC004307). 
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The same sense of realism is also induced when we look in detail at other 
educational recipients of philanthropic money. Local authority schools are not 
recognised as charities, and so do not benefit from philanthropic donations except 
very peripherally. Independent schools can fully benefit, and try assiduously to do so, 
but even their income from donations and endowments in 2016 was a mere 2.7% of 
total income.3 
It is not that Scotland or the UK are ungenerous by current international standards. 
The UK was 8th most generous in 2016 for monetary donation out of 139 countries 
ranked by the World Giving Index. Two thirds of people in the UK gave money, 
similar to the Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand, and actually ahead of the 
USA.  Scotland is slightly more generous than the UK average (Charities Aid 
Foundation, 2017b: 35; Charities Aid Foundation, 2017a: 7; Paterson, 2013: 5). 
The problem is not, moreover, one of tax allowances, since the framework in the 
UK is very similar to that in the USA (More Partnership, 2012: 6). Even in the USA, 
usually thought of as the home of philanthropy, only about 5-6% of all educational 
expenditure comes from philanthropic sources.4 
Now, there is no doubt that there was greater philanthropic giving in the past. But 
it is important not to exaggerate this either, and it declined a long time ago as the role 
of the state grew. Best known in Scotland are the Carnegie grants in the early years of 
the twentieth century which operated like a quasi-state source for universities. 
Carnegie capital grants were greater than state grants in the first decade of the 
twentieth century (Anderson, 1983: 288). Carnegie bursaries for students paid half the 
fees of around 70% of eligible students in the early 1920s and 1930s (Carnegie Trust, 
1926). Specific philanthropic effort at that time before the state started to pay for 
infrastructure was impressive. The greatest predominantly philanthropic endeavours 
for universities were moving Glasgow University to Gilmorehill, and building the 
new university college of Dundee (Checkland, 1980: 129-30). Nevertheless, although 
there was more philanthropic giving to universities in the past, as state support grew, 
philanthropic support fell. Indeed, for what we would now call recurrent expenditure 
– as distinct from capital – already in 1894 the endowment income of Scottish 
universities had fallen to less than one fifth.  Fees and state grants made up over three 
quarters (Anderson, 1983: 289). 
Somewhat the same kind of story applies to schools, but starting earlier. 
Philanthropic contributions declined as state funding grew. At the time of the 1872 
Education Act – which established the modern system of public, or primary, schools –
the income of these schools from endowments was about one quarter of their income 
from endowments and state grants together.5 The endowments for education authority 
schools then were consolidated and removed, some being used for secondary schools.  
So by 1906, endowment income and voluntary contributions for the primary schools 
had fallen to 2.5% of all income, down from a quarter, similar in magnitude to fees 
(2%); the bulk (90%) came from various central and local public sources (compiled 
from Scotch Education Department, 1908, Table 3). As secondary schools also then 
began to grow, the same process of state substitution for endowment emerged again. 
In 1912, even the urban ‘higher class’ schools and the old endowed secondary schools 
received only 13% of income from endowments (Anderson, 1983: 247), whereas 
before the 1890s they had been almost entirely funded by endowments and fees.6  
Moreover, the newer secondary schools that had been founded in the first decade of 
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the new century (about four fifths of all secondary schools) had only 1.3% of income 
from endowments (Anderson, 1983: 247). 
In truth, even though philanthropy declined relative to the state as each sector of 
education expanded, Scotland had never been generously provided with endowments. 
The Argyll Commission report of 1864 pointed out that Eton or Winchester schools 
alone had greater revenue from landed property and church livings than the revenue 
from endowments of all the burgh schools and all the universities of Scotland taken 
together (Argyll Commission, 1864: 19; Morgan, 1927: 97). That lack of endowment 
was partly because, historically, Scotland had been a relatively poor country. But it 
was also ultimately because of the failure of one of the central intentions of the 
sixteenth-century Reformers who had established Scotland’s strong tradition in 
education. They had intended that the patrimony of the pre-Reformation church be 
devoted to schools, but it was diverted to the nobility who did not spend it in that way. 
Town councils and the new church had to compensate, which they did until the state 
took over mainly from the late-nineteenth century onwards (Morgan, 1927: 97-99). 
In short, philanthropy has never played more than a small role in Scottish 
education since the advent of a mass system and the welfare state, and to an extent for 
even longer. 
The Philosophy of Philanthropy 
But to say that this is all a consequence of the rise of the state or the fall of the old 
church is too mechanical, because these changes themselves also involved human 
choices. So, in trying to understand philanthropy, we will now look at motives, both 
currently and in the past: why do people contribute philanthropically to education (or 
to anything else)? Considering motives might help also to indicate what would have 
to happen for philanthropy to become truly important. 
A typical conclusion about the motives of recent philanthropy is that reached by 
Theresa Lloyd (of the University of Kent), who found five motives to be influential 
on wealthy philanthropists (Lloyd, 2004: 3): 
 The first was belief in a cause, which was very often the importance of 
education. 
 The second was being a catalyst for change, such as widening access to 
education. 
 The third was personal fulfilment, pursuing idealistic goals.  
 The fourth was a sense of duty, returning to society some of the riches 
which society had enabled them to accumulate.  
 And the fifth was about building relationships, strengthening the 
connections with institutions that had been influential on them, notably 
schools and universities. 
Perhaps, to get more philanthropic money, all that is needed then is to provide more 
opportunities for such motives to be expressed. 
But it is not that simple, since each of these five motives depend on a propitious 
social context. The significant causes have to be socially acceptable if social change is 
to come about. Personal idealism can have a social impact only if it not merely 
eccentric. There has to be recognition of wealth as conferring duties, which means 
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society’s accepting wealth as legitimate. Personal achievement has to be accepted as 
also an expression of a social identity. Thus philanthropic motives are never enough 
of an explanation on their own. We also have to consider how the motives are 
perceived socially. Therefore, to understand changing philanthropy over time, we 
have to consider changing contexts. 
So for the rest of this essay we will be assessing three philosophies of philanthropy 
that have been eloquently expressed in Scotland over the past couple of centuries. 
What kind of social context did each depend on, and might any analogous relationship 
of the individual and society be recovered today? The three come from moments in 
modern Scottish history when things seemed to be changing fundamentally. These are 
separated by half centuries, the final one coming to an end about half a century ago. 
The first is when industrial capitalism was rapidly growing, roughly the mid-
nineteenth century. The second is when industrial capitalism was acquiring a 
conscience, roughly the turn of the twentieth century. And the third is when the 
welfare state came to fruition, in the mid-twentieth century. These resulted in three 
world-views that rest on three ways of understanding philanthropy, what might be 
called religiously inspired charity, business heroism, and paternalistic welfare. For 
each of these, the motives may be illustrated by considering one prominent and 
influential Scottish exponent of the philanthropic ideas of the age. We will then return 
to ask questions about philanthropy in Scottish education today. 
Religiously inspired charity 
Olive Checkland, in her magisterial survey of philanthropy in Victorian Scotland, 
noted that ‘for the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century the state left the entire 
field of education to charity and to private ventures’ (Checkland, 1980: 130). That has 
tended later to be seen as an abdication of responsibility, but the Christian tradition 
would have disagreed.  Reciprocity actually itself constitutes Christian responsibility. 
So the first example of an attempted philanthropic response to social problems is from 
the first great wave of industrialism. The person who can epitomise this for us is 
Thomas Chalmers, who, S. J. Brown notes, ‘was widely acknowledged to be the 
greatest Scottish churchman of the nineteenth century’ (Brown, 1992: 62; Brown, 
1983; Brown, 2004). 
Chalmers was leader of the new Free Church that burst onto Scottish life at the 
Disruption of 1843, which was described later by Gladstone as ‘the noblest collective 
example of … almsgiving known, in modern times, to this or perhaps to any country’ 
(Gladstone, 1890: 692) – a remarkable but eventually unsuccessful exercise in 
Christian philanthropy that embraced the whole of society. Chalmers was born in 
1780 in Anstruther. His father and maternal grandfather were merchants in the small 
fishing towns of the East Neuk. He was initially a Church of Scotland minister, and 
was throughout his life a political liberal. He was sympathetic to the original ideas of 
the French revolution and to the philosophy and science of the Scottish 
Enlightenment. He converted theologically to evangelical piety in 1811, having come 
to believe that the only way forward was through a communal church based on the 
Calvinist principle of mutual social responsibility independent of the state. 
His evangelical preaching became so renowned within a few years that he was 
poached by the town council of Glasgow, where he was shocked by the poverty and 
social chaos of the new industrialism. His solution was to try to recover that original 
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communal Calvinism, a core part of which would be the personal responsibility of the 
wealthy for the poor and the unchurched. He persuaded the council to create a new 
parish in St John’s in the Gallowgate area where he tried this out. His communal 
Christianity depended on neighbourhood charity to provide schools as well as poor 
relief. It rested on the Enlightenment belief that charity, properly understood, would 
reform human nature, of the donor as well as of the recipient. 
That small experiment largely worked in its own terms, which prepared Chalmers 
for the bigger project of church extension for which the Church’s general assembly 
gave him responsibility in 1834. By 1841, he had presided over the creation of 222 
new territorial churches, with schools, increasing the total by about one fifth. It was 
philanthropic giving by all – the pennies of the poor and the hundreds of the rich. 
But ultimately this church extension failed because the state would not support it 
with further grants. At the Disruption, Chalmers led four tenths of ministers and about 
half of lay members out of the national church, partly on this matter and partly on the 
principle of the rights of local congregations to choose their own minister. The 
achievement of the Free Church was then indeed remarkable, as Gladstone noted: 700 
parish churches (compared to about 900 parishes in the national church), 500 schools, 
400 manses, the Free Church College (now New College of Edinburgh University). 
There was a sustentation fund where wealthier congregations subsidised poorer ones. 
For these new schools, Chalmers favoured combining permanent endowment with 
moderate fees. This was the policy of the sixteenth-century Reformers, he said, and 
made education a custom not a compulsion. Endowment was needed to enable high-
quality teachers to be employed in schools for all social classes. 
So in Chalmers’s Christian vision, the whole community were philanthropists 
because the community was Christian, and because Calvinist Christianity had a 
concept of mutual support at its heart. He wrote in 1841 that ‘the appropriate remedy 
for the evils of want is to be found, not in the justice of man, but in the compassion of 
man’ (quoted by Mitchison, 2000: 159). ‘The ties of kindliness’, he had said in 1820 
at the opening of two new schools in St John’s, ‘will be multiplied between the 
wealthy and the labouring classes. … The wide and melancholy gulf of suspicion will 
come at length to be filled up by the attentions of a soft and pleasing fellowship’ 
(quoted by Withrington, 1988: 48). That in practice meant a form of progressive 
redistribution since the rich would give more. 
Christianity of this Calvinist sort also rested on a firm principle of personal 
independence. The problem with legally sanctioned poor relief, Chalmers believed, 
was that it created barriers between rich and poor, diminishing natural benevolence, 
and undermining the independence of the recipients. So as important as stimulating 
the charity of all was nurturing independence to avoid pauperisation. Even 
philanthropy, if solely from the rich, could be external, like the state. This principle is 
indeed easy to caricature as intending to make the poor responsible for escaping 
poverty. But that was not its intention since its aim was human dignity. Why that was 
the case can be understood only if we bear in mind the fundamentally Calvinist 
context.  
The problem in the end for Chalmers was that this Christian philosophy patently 
did not work any more. Chalmers died in 1847, disillusioned and, after all, coming 
round to the idea that only the state could be powerful enough to achieve the kind of 
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society he wanted (Brown, 1983: 367). The 100,000 people who observed his funeral 
procession to the cemetery in the Grange in Edinburgh where he is buried testified to 
his celebrity more than his legacy (Brown, 1983: 371). Remarkable though the range 
of philanthropic activities were in nineteenth-century Britain, it was clear by the last 
few decades of the century that charity was not enough. In particular, for Scottish 
schools, it was no longer possible to imagine that a national system could be sustained 
by voluntary effort – hence the long campaign which started in the aftermath of the 
Disruption to have a national system that was funded and managed by the state. It was 
also not possible that the necessary modernisation of the universities could be funded 
entirely by donations. The bonds of the stable Christian community of the rural past 
could not be recreated from below. And so, in Storrar’s words, 
 
Chalmers was the last Scottish churchman to advocate a comprehensive and 
coherent version of the old Calvinist vision of church and nation as one Christian 
community that stood any chance of being realised in a modern society. 
(Storrar, 1990: 42) 
 
Before we move on, however, one cardinal principle from Chalmers’s ideas is 
worth emphasising in our much more pecuniary age: philanthropy – love of humanity 
– for him and his contemporaries was never only about money. It was also about 
character; it was a moral relationship. There is room for that only if there is an active 
sense of individual responsibility (not only via the state), and only if there is 
something like Chalmers’s sense of the moral condition of the recipients. The view 
was summed up well by another Scottish liberal advocate of philanthropy, Samuel 
Smiles: 
 
Money is power after its sort, it is true; but intelligence, public spirit, and moral 
virtue, are powers too, and far nobler ones. 
(Smiles, 1996 [1866]: 191) 
 
That did leave room for the spirit of philanthropy even after the state assumed 
responsibility for education. For example, voluntary time spent on School Boards 
after 1872 was an extension of philanthropic giving (for both men and women). In 
particular, all teaching is in a sense philanthropic in a moral sense, whether or not any 
money is involved. Teaching is, rather, like grace. 
This moral basis of philanthropy inevitably has deeply religious connotations, 
which is why the ultimate failure of Chalmers to fulfil his philanthropic ideals is 
crucial to understanding what has happened to philanthropy since. The religious 
foundation of philanthropy is encapsulated in the Christian concept of alms, which 
Aquinas defined as ‘a deed whereby something is given to the needy, out of 
compassion and for God’s sake’ (Summa Theologica, second part of second part, 32, 
1). Behind that lay St Paul’s ‘though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, … and 
have not charity, it profiteth me nothing’. The same religious foundation of 
philanthropy is present in the Jewish concept of tzedakah, meaning both justice and 
charity, a key idea for Spinoza and through him for that influential part of the 
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Enlightenment that led to democracy (Topolski, 2016). It is expressed also by the 
Islamic idea of sedaqa, the same concept and indeed the same word as in Hebrew. 
Sedaqa contributed to the medieval madrasas of Baghdad which, in their free enquiry 
and disputation, form one of the origins of the very idea of a university (Makdisi, 
1981: 38, 58). 
So, as we consider the later development of the idea of philanthropy, this moral 
aspect is fundamental. Philanthropy is not just about money. It is indeed about the 
love of humanity. 
Business heroism 
The moral power of money then neatly takes us to the next philanthropic philosophy – 
that of Andrew Carnegie. In a sense it would be impossible not to, since Carnegie is 
the epitome of the rich philanthropist. He is by far Scotland’s – and probably the 
world’s – most famous philanthropist. And that is partly because even those more 
recent illustrious philanthropists who might now rival Carnegie in his fame – such as 
Bill Gates, Warren Buffett, or, in Scotland, Tom Hunter – have been influenced by 
Carnegie’s philosophy of philanthropy. That philosophy was expressed in his essay 
The Gospel of Wealth (originally in 1889), the most famous quotation from which is 
his belief that ‘he who dies rich dies disgraced’ (Carnegie, 1962 [1900]: 49). 
In any case, whatever else may have led to Carnegie’s having a legacy, the actual 
physical embodiment of what he did with his wealth is perennially inescapable. At his 
death, Carnegie had given away $350m, or about 90% of his wealth (Nasaw, 2006: 
801); that would be worth about $4.9bn7 today. He left two thirds of what remained to 
one of his many charitable foundations. During his life, he funded 2,811 free public 
libraries, of which 660 are in Britain and 56 in Scotland (Tweedale, 2004; Aitken, 
1956: 462-464). He paid for 7,689 church organs, including 1,005 in Scotland, to give 
everyone the chance to experience free what he believed to be the civilising power of 
great music (Nasaw, 2006: 608). We have already noted that he pioneered what was 
in effect the public financial support of students at Scottish universities, and the public 
finance of infrastructure. And he tried to stop war through his Endowment for 
International Peace, with $5m in 1910 (Nasaw, 2006: 742). The consequences of that 
failure probably hastened his death in 1919. 
Carnegie was born in Dunfermline in 1835, about half a century after Chalmers. 
He came from a politically radical family: his father was a weaver, and his mother’s 
father was the leading Chartist radical in the town. Thus, compared to Chalmers’s 
religious beliefs, his family traditions were a different ethical response to the 
displacement of capitalist industrialism. The economic depression of the 1840s led the 
family to emigrate to Pittsburgh in 1848 (the year of European revolution). Carnegie 
started work as a clerk on the Pennsylvania Railroad, and from there rose remarkably 
on the basis of astute commitment to technological change, insight into the character 
of business associates, wise investment, and – as he recognised – frequent good luck. 
By 1868, aged 35, he had assets of $400,000 dollars, worth about $7m today 
(Tweedale, 2004). By then he also had doubts about the worship of money, which he 
regarded as debasing, but he kept on investing, mainly in iron and steel. When he 
eventually sold his major steel company to J. P. Morgan in 1901 he received one 
thousand times ($447m) what he had had thirty years earlier, or $13bn today 
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(Tweedale, 2004). He then occupied the remaining two decades of his life giving it 
away. His motive was not shame at being a magnate, or guilt at being rich, and it was 
certainly not religion. The main motive was returning his fortune to the larger 
community where he believed it belonged: 
 
The fundamental idea of the gospel of wealth is that surplus wealth should be 
considered as a sacred trust to be administered by those into whose hands it falls, 
during their lives, for the good of the community. 
(Carnegie (1962 [1900]: 55) 
 
Just as we should look to Christian ideas for the explanation of Chalmers’s work, 
so, to understand Carnegie’s philanthropic motivation, we have to understand a view 
of capitalism that is now not at all popular in Scotland. We are apt now to be cynical 
when we read proclamations such as these from The Gospel of Wealth: 
 
What is the proper mode of administering wealth after the laws upon which 
civilization is founded have thrown it into the hands of the few? 
(Carnegie (1962 [1900]: 19) 
 
The problem of our age is the proper administration of wealth, [so] that the ties of 
brotherhood may still bind together the rich and poor in harmonious relationship’. 
(Carnegie (1962 [1900]: 14) 
 
Left-wing Scotland might be even more puzzled or dismayed by his comment that 
‘without wealth there can be no Mæcenas’ (Carnegie (1962 [1900]: 15), referring to 
the Roman citizen whose name has become synonymous in several European 
languages with philanthropic patronage of the arts. Scottish left-wing opinion may 
recall that the necessity of wealth for charity was the essence of Margaret Thatcher’s 
speech to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1988 (Margaret 
Thatcher Foundation, 2017). 
Nevertheless, however unfashionable in Scotland at the moment, the philosophy 
for this was coherent, and included impeccably Scottish sources, from the 
Enlightenment, in common with politically radical Enlightenment thinkers elsewhere. 
This idea is that all commerce is civilising. So, for the purposes of sustaining a civil 
society, philanthropy is no different from the impulse that created the wealth in the 
first place. 
On the civilising influence of commerce, there is David Hume in 1742: ‘nothing is 
more favourable to the rise of politeness and learning, than a number of neighbouring 
and independent states, connected together by commerce and policy’ (Hume, 1742). 
Likewise, there is Adam Smith claiming in 1763 that ‘it is commerce that introduces 
probity and punctuality’ (Smith, 1763). Or, still from within Scotland, there is 
William Robertson, historian and principal of Edinburgh University for most of the 
second half of the eighteenth century, who wrote in 1769 that ‘commerce ... softens 
and polishes the manners of men’ (quoted by Hirschman, 1982:1465). 
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In politically radical circles outside Scotland, these ideas were the absolutely 
standard view of commerce in the Enlightenment and after. Montesquieu had written 
in 1749 that ‘it is almost a general rule that wherever manners are gentle there is 
commerce; and wherever there is commerce, manners are gentle’ (quoted by 
Hirschman, 1982: 1464). Thomas Paine argued in 1792 that: 
 
[commerce] is a pacific system, operating to cordialise mankind, by rendering 
Nations, as well as individuals, useful to each other. … The invention of commerce 
… is the greatest approach towards universal civilization that has yet been made by 
any means not immediately flowing from moral principles. 
(quoted by Hirschman, 1982: 1465).  
 
The same view influenced also feminist thinkers such as, slightly later, Harriet 
Martineau, who believed that commerce specifically benefits the poor: she judged, 
writing about her tour of the USA in the 1830s, that by bringing different social 
interests together ‘for objects which require concession and mutual subordination’, 
‘the spirit of commerce … is, on the whole, honourable to the people’ (Martineau, 
1837: 359-360). Albert Hirschman has noted furthermore that this idea that commerce 
actually forges the bonds of society is the very basis of sociology as formulated by 
Durkheim in the early years of the twentieth century, which also ultimately derives 
from Enlightenment Scotland (Hirschman, 1982: 1471; MacRae, 1969; Brewer and 
Craig, 2007).  
As a result of this tradition of Enlightenment thought, the self-image of the 
nineteenth-century capitalist right up to the First World War was as the guarantor of 
civilisation. Carnegie was well aware of this. He wrote in 1891 in defence of The 
Gospel of Wealth that  
 
those who insure steady employment to thousands, at wages not lower than others 
pay, need not be ashamed of their record; for steady employment is, after all, the 
one indispensable requisite for the welfare and the progress of the people, 
(quoted by Nasaw, 2006: 522) 
 
which is an unconscious echo of Martineau. Carnegie’s pacifism came from a similar 
belief in the civilising power of commerce. He wrote in 1907 that 
 
the world is getting to be like a workshop in which it is an impertinence and an 
outrage for two men to drop their tools and engage in a fisticuff and a scuffle to the 
destruction of the whole shop. … The human race is one. … The interest of 
thousands who depend on the manufacture of agricultural implements or 
machinery of other sorts is at stake when the farms of Russia are lying untilled or 
the factories of Germany are closed because men are off to the wars. 
(quoted by Nasaw, 2006: 724) 
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That is why Carnegie did not interpret philanthropy as a compensation for the other 
things he did. Philanthropy was the pursuit of the civilising effects of commerce by 
other means. He was as sceptical of irresponsible capitalism as the most advanced 
liberals of his day. But the solution, to him, lay in the ethical responsibilities of the 
capitalist, not in the state. He was a close friend of John Morley, radical Liberal MP 
and government minister, and biographer of Gladstone. Gladstone himself reviewed 
The Gospel of Wealth: 
 
It must not be forgotten that the kind of wealth which chiefly grows is what may be 
called irresponsible wealth: wealth little watched and checked by opinion, little 
brought into immediate contact with duty. 
(Gladstone, 1890: 679) 
 
Carnegie was also firmly opposed to slavery, and hence was close to the Republicans 
and the federal states, and he rather hero-worshipped Booker T. Washington, whom 
he called the the ‘Moses and Joshua of his people’, and ‘perhaps the most remarkable 
man living today’ (quoted by Nasaw, 2006: 714). 
So the key to understanding all aspects of Carnegie is a belief in commerce – as the 
maker of civilisation as well as the source of the profits that would enable the great 
commercial magnate to be also the great philanthropist.  
That philosophy is as much in the past now as is Chalmers’s belief in a Christian 
commonwealth. The subsequent century has reversed the whole view. Under the 
influence of thinkers as diverse as John Stuart Mill, Keynes, Popper and Marx, we 
have come to view capitalism without intervention from the state as destructive of 
civilisation. Popper sums up this belief as that: ‘unlimited freedom means that a 
strong man is free to bully one who is weak and to rob him of his freedom’ (Popper, 
1966: 124). 
Thus far Carnegie might have agreed, and indeed he once half-jestingly called himself 
a socialist because he believed that people ought to ‘work for the general welfare’ and 
‘share their riches with their neighbours’ (quoted by Nasaw, 2006: 257). But 
Carnegie’s belief was not statist. He would not have agreed with the next step in even 
the firmly liberal Popper’s argument, a step which we largely take for granted: 
 
This is why we demand that the state should limit freedom to a certain extent, so 
that everyone's freedom is protected by law. Nobody should be at the mercy of 
others, but all should have a right to be protected by the state. 
(Popper, 1966: 124) 
 
Carnegie’s was not a selfish worldview, despite present-day detractors. It was a 
personal morality that was both communal and deeply individual. So it could never 
have satisfied the reinterpretation of philanthropy which came next, which is our third 
and last example of philanthropic philosophy: the era of the welfare state. 
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Paternalistic welfare 
We do not usually interpret the welfare state as an expression of philanthropy, and 
indeed the one was contrasted with the other earlier in this essay. But in trying to 
understand what has happened to philanthropy since the middle of the twentieth 
century, it is valuable to recall that a central motive which led to the welfare state was 
a sense of social duty mediated through the state. Commerce on its own had failed to 
create the good society (despite Carnegie), and Christianity free of the state had failed 
to counter-act the worst effects of commerce (despite Chalmers). The state, moreover 
– as taught by both Chalmers and Carnegie – was a potentially dangerous Leviathan. 
So perhaps a state informed by a Christian concept of charitable duty as well as 
Christian humility could resolve all these contradictions. 
To illustrate the Scottish aspects of this, we can take a third thinker about the 
practical aspects of philanthropy – the Scottish theologian John Baillie (Fergusson, 
1993; Newlands, 2004). Baillie was born in 1886, half a century after Carnegie (and a 
century after Chalmers). He was the son of the Free Church minister in Gairloch. He 
and his brother Donald both graduated from Edinburgh University in philosophy and 
divinity, and both went on to become distinguished theologians. John Baillie worked 
as an academic theologian in New York and Toronto in the 1920s. At the Union 
Theological Seminary in New York he met Reinhold Niebuhr, who became a lifelong 
associate. With others, they had a very strong influence on the World Council of 
Churches from 1937. He returned to Edinburgh in 1934 to become professor of 
divinity there. It was in that position that he made his most important contribition to 
public life in Scotland. 
In 1940, the Church of Scotland set up a Commission with the rather grand title 
‘for the interpretation of God’s will in the present crisis’. Baillie chaired it. The 
Baillie Commission was Scotland’s most distinguished contribution to the debate 
about the welfare state, though remarkably almost completely forgotten today (but see 
the collection of essays edited by Morton (1994)). Among its recommendations were 
elements of a programme that were at least as radical as that which was pursued by 
the post-war Labour government of the UK: ‘The possessors of economic power must 
be answerable for the use of that power, not only to their own consciencies, but to 
appropriate social organs’ (quoted by Smith, 1987: 378). 
It cast these views in the tradition of Calvinism: 
 
Selfishness is of the very essence of the sin from which … men need to be 
redeemed; but what if there be no particular form of this sin from which we more 
need to be redeemed today than a complacent indifference to the social evils that 
surround our comfortable lives? 
(quoted by Smith, 1987: 377) 
 
The philosophy was about mutual human dependence: ‘our interdependence is given 
in the very nature of our being’ (quoted by Forrester, 1993: 226). Asserting that 
principle would be the return of the ‘spirit of community after the long reign of 
individualism’ (quoted by Forrester, 1993: 227). And the philosophy was about duty 
and humility: 
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Many of us [Christians] must plead guilty to the … damaging charge of 
complacently accepting the amenities, and availing ourselves of the privileges, of a 
social order which happened to offer these things to ourselves while denying it to 
others. 
(quoted by Smith, 1987: 375) 
 
The views of the Commission were then highly influential on political thinking on the 
left (Cheyne, 1993: 185; Forrester, 1993: 232; Harvie, 1983: 939; Smith, 1987: 373). 
What was notable was that the Commission placed an entire Christian denomination 
behind the project for the welfare state.  
Christianity thus brought to an interpretation of the welfare state a sense of moral 
duty, which – as with Chalmers and Carnegie – is a philanthropic impulse. The sense 
of philanthropic duties indeed actually came from Chalmers, since his ideas inspired 
late-nineteenth-century Christian collectivism in Glasgow, what was often called 
municipal socialism (Brown, 1992). There were communal ideas in the university 
extension movement at that time (Checkland, 1980: 304). A similar Christian spirit, 
again, informed the early development of social work (Cree, 1995). These ideas were 
an attempt to address the reasons why Chalmers had failed, but from within the same 
tradition of Christian benevolence and mutual responsibility as had lain at the heart of 
his work. 
The new element in the 1940s was a belief that the state could articulate duty. That 
role of the state is also then what differentiates the welfare-state idea of philanthropy 
from Carnegie’s. And the importance of duty is what distinguishes it from the ideas 
that are dominant today. John Baillie sought to reconcile the idea of the state with 
personal obligation in an essay of 1945: 
 
No institution … can flourish on the basis of legal compulsion alone, dispensing 
altogether with love; nor is there any personal relationship that is altogether 
independent of institutions, and into which there enters no element of justice. 
(Baillie, 1945: 58) 
 
Thus in reply to Chalmers’s assertion that the solution to social problems ‘is to be 
found, not in the justice of man, but in the compassion of man’, Baillie would reply 
that the implied opposition is spurious: justice through the state depended, he thought, 
on Christian compassion, which, as love of humanity, is philanthropy. 
A specifically educational instance of Christian duty at the heart of Scottish 
welfare-state thinking is in the various reports of the Advisory Council on Education 
in Scotland in the late 1940s. These reports were acutely aware of the difficult balance 
that had to be struck, when educating children, between freedom and the necessary 
duties without which freedom could not be guaranteed. For example, in a 1947 report, 
they said that the purpose of secondary education should be to fill ‘the years of youth 
with security, graciousness and ordered freedom’, defining through that word ‘grace’ 
both ‘the high disinterested care’ that teachers ought to have and the ‘responsive 
friendliness’ which such care would, they believed, inspire in the young (Scottish 
Education Department, 1947: 10-11). So education is not only an expression of that 
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philanthropic grace which is at the heart of all teaching, but might also – in a 
democratic age – be a stimulant of further understanding that citizens have duties to 
each other. 
Thus we see in these views from Baillie, from the Commission he chaired, and 
from other contemporary sources, a view of the welfare state as embodying a love of 
humanity, or philanthropy. It was a reminder that one of the romantic critiques of 
capitalism had been that it destroyed charity and love. That had been a conservative 
critique – notably for Scotland from Thomas Carlyle (for example, Carlyle, 1858 
[1829]). Gladstone had written in his review of Carnegie’s Gospel of Wealth that: 
 
we pay a heavy price, in what Carlyle called the establishment of cash payment as 
the sole nexus between man and man. The ties, the relations, … which were strictly 
human, have very largely become mechanical. 
(Gladstone, 1890: 681) 
 
These Christian views now became, in the statist twentieth century, a belief in a 
philanthropic society, whose reciprocity creates the state and is guaranteed by the 
state. 
Though this welfare-state idea might seem to survive better than the other two 
philosophies that we have been considering, it is actually as remote as they are, 
eroded by political and social change since the 1980s. Reciprocal duty is not now felt 
to be the defining feature of the welfare state. Duncan Forrester, one of Baillie’s 
distinguished successors in the School of Divinity at Edinburgh University (and who 
died in 2016, a further half a century on in our story) suggested why duties have come 
to be replaced by individual rights: it was because the original conception of the 
welfare state was paternalistically Fabian, which was a legacy of late-nineteenth 
century philanthropy. He concluded in 1985 that, although ‘the anti-welfare consensus 
may be partly contrived and manipulated by the popular press’, nevertheless that 
suspicion of the state: 
 
also springs out of … the experience of inflated expectations disappointed by a 
remote and unintelligible bureaucratic system, by the contrast between the 
supermarket where the shopper is treated with respect and given freedom of choice 
because one person’s money is as good as the next’s, and the dowdy, impersonal 
social security office. 
(Forrester, 1985: 49) 
 
Forrester was writing from a position on the political left. But the most politically 
potent critique of the philanthropic paternalism in the welfare state came from the 
political right – Hayek and Friedman most notably. A comment from Hayek in 1960 
is not far from those that later came to be taken for granted in the left’s assault on 
paternalism and the left’s assertion of rights: ‘The greatest danger to liberty today 
comes from … the efficient expert administrators exclusively concerned with what 
they regard as the public good’ (Hayek, 1960: 262). 
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That represents the mandarin as the administrator of the philanthropy of the state, just 
like the officials to whom Carnegie delegated the management of his charitable trusts, 
who in turn were like the managers to whom he entrusted the management of his 
businesses. 
A later conservative, Roger Scruton, is less convinced by Hayek’s critique of the 
charitable state, and is more sympathetic to the charitable impulse: ‘To a certain 
extent the egalitarian outlook in politics stems from a suspicion of charity, and a 
desire to construe all duties as duties of justice’, not love (Scruton, 2014: 49). Scruton 
may regret this, but his point remains, like those of Forrester and Hayek. The state is 
alien (as seen from the right) or paternalistic (when seen from the left) because it was 
conceived on the model of philanthropy. The response from the left is to say that the 
state ought to be based on rights, and the response from the right is that the state ought 
to be based on consumer choice, which is another way of saying that it should be 
based on the rights of the impersonal market place devoid of the civilising effects of 
commerce that were expected in the tradition from Hume to Carnegie. So every 
position converges on the assertion of individual rights, to the exclusion of duty and 
therefore also of charity. Where duties are asserted, they too are individual – the duty 
to look for a job, or to pass exams. The duties that are neglected are those to society in 
the form that the philanthropic motive enjoins. 
This ascendancy of rights over social duty, of contract over love of humanity, is 
also, in welfare-state terms, the eclipsing of Richard Titmuss by T. H. Marshall, 
whose explanation of the welfare state as the embodiment of social rights is now the 
central focus of academic debate. Lost with that account is Titmuss’s metaphor of the 
welfare state as what he called a ‘gift relationship’, or a form of mutual philanthropy 
based on loyalty and shared belonging, much more than on rights (Titmuss, 1970; 
Marshall, 1950). 
Most writers about the welfare state would, accordingly, now argue that a society 
founded on individual rights is preferable to a society founded on obligations. Perhaps 
we might be inclined to agree because paternalism without the consent of those being 
patronised, or unless they are children, is now widely deplored, ultimately for Mills’s 
reason that ‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His 
own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant’ (Mill, 1859, ch. 1). 
Notions of false consciousness, where an autonomous adult does not properly 
understand their own interests – and which thus might justify paternalistic 
intervention – are deeply problematic for any kind of liberal philosophy, ultimately 
because, as Lukes points out, even the most subjugated of humans have the capacity 
to imagine a different world (Lukes, 2005: 138-151). Philanthropy leaves all the 
imagination to the philanthropist. 
But that is all rather beside the point for the purposes of this essay. Whether or not 
a preference for rights is shared, a society based on rights is not likely to be a society 
where the obligations of philanthropy flourish. If you have a right to my money, then 
any money I give you is not philanthropic – not given out of love for humanity – but 
is expropriation, a more euphemistic term for which is taxation. If I assert my right 
not to give you any money, then I am denying any obligation, and am again, then, not 
acting out of any kind of love. That is why John Baillie’s recognition of the love 
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inherent in his Christian idea of the welfare state seems as quaintly old fashioned as 
the ideas of Chalmers or of Carnegie. Rights dispense with the need for love. 
Conclusions 
Drawing this all now together, we should remind ourselves of the statistics that were 
summarised earlier showing the relative insignificance of philanthropy in the overall 
scheme of things in Scottish education today. Despite all the rhetoric, donations and 
endowments make up under 1% of the income of the Scottish universities, and even 
for independent schools make up under 3%. 
Philanthropy can still be valuable in small but important ways. That might include 
providing opportunities for gifted children, and specialist schools, as was argued in 
the 2011 report which was referred to at the beginning. There still does seem, 
moreover, to be a role for philanthropy in helping to renovate important historical 
buildings, such as the McEwan Hall at Edinburgh University (Ross-CASE, 2017: 20), 
though a certain cultural decline is rather evident in the disfigurement of Bristo 
Square which the new entrance to that building has imposed upon us. A high standard 
of aesthetic taste was a common characteristic of philanthropists in the past, William 
McEwan and Carnegie among them. 
But the main theme here is that the historical context has changed fundamentally. 
To hope for a significantly greater amount of philanthropy would be to ask for the 
return of a moral universe that has gone – a return to the sense of social duty rather 
than individual rights in the welfare state, a return to the idea that commerce is 
intrinsically civilising, or a return to a Christian (or other religious) community. All 
three of our examples were seeking that defining moral framework which Aquinas 
said was the basis of almsgiving, but all three have now been superseded. None of 
these three sets of motives now seems remotely plausible. For philanthropy we are in 
a similar position to that which Alasdair MacIntyre said we inhabit for morality as a 
whole: ‘The language of morality … [embodies] the fragments of a conceptual 
scheme, parts of which now lack those contexts from which their significance 
derived’ (MacIntyre, 1981: 2). None of the conceptual schemes that sustained 
extensive philanthropy in the past has survived. 
In particular, the political left now says almost nothing about voluntary moral 
obligation as central to citizenship, and indeed when some left-wing politicians do try 
to insist on it, such as Tony Blair, they are accused by liberals of being authoritarian 
(for example, Dahrendorf, 1999). The force of the left’s objections to philanthropy 
which were quoted from the event mentioned at the beginning of this essay in truth 
does not lie in the complaint about the wealthy philanthropists but rather in the 
insistence on rights against mutual duties, and so the left’s explanation for the decline 
of philanthropy is based on the premise that the state is simply a guarantor of rights 
rather than an expression of citizens’ duties to each other. On the political right, the 
notion of recripocal responsibility is faintly echoed in the expectations of recent 
philanthropists that there should be some kind of ‘contract’. But ad hoc contracts for 
each specific act of giving miss the underpinning moral framework of these earlier 
visions of philanthropy where the very notion of a contract was unnecessary because a 
sense of obligation was a moral sentiment deep in society.  
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Recripocal responsibility is echoed also in philanthropists’ ideal of fulfilling 
themselves, which we should never deprecate even in a thoroughly secular and 
cynical age. There is always, for the individual, David Hume’s comment on 
benevolence that ‘we may feel a desire of another’s happiness or good, which, by 
means of that affection, becomes our own good, and is afterwards pursued, from the 
combined motives of benevolence and self-enjoyment’ (Hume, 1751). But a moral 
framework cannot be sustained only by a few, and, here, cannot by sustained only by 
a few wealthy givers. Political slogans, however worthy, do not themselves re-create 
the moral community that John Baillie or Andrew Carnegie or Thomas Chalmers 
were seeking. 
The question of philanthropy, when examined over two centuries, thus tells us 
about a lot more than merely the technical matter of the amount of charitable 
donations. It raises fundamental questions about the nature of society, of its sustaining 
moral values, and of the role of government and every citizen in seeing to the welfare 
of all. The versions of philanthropy with which Scotland has attempted to give 
answers to these challenges have been varied and imaginative – non-state 
voluntarism, civilising commerce, state welfare. None any longer works, and so 
philanthropy – however individually admirable and locally effective – is unlikely to 
make any more than a marginal contribution to Scotland’s educational welfare. 
 
                                                 
1 This essay started as the Third Enlightenment Lecture at Edinburgh University, 31 October 2017. The 
author is grateful to the organisers of that event for the opportunity to raise the issues discussed here. 
2 Author’s notes from the meeting. 
3 Most of their income is from fees. Calculated from the individual school entries in the web page of 
the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator (2017) [22 September 2017], with the list of independent 
schools from the Scottish Council of Independent Schools (2017) [22 September 2017].  
4 Giving USA estimates that in 2014 the total amount of philanthropic giving to education was 
$54.62bn (Giving USA, 2015). OECD, (2017, Table B2.3), shows that (in 2014) 6.2% of the GDP of 
the USA was spent on education (from all sources, public and private). The GDP of the USA in 2014 
was $17,427bn (OECD data, 2017). 54.62 is approximately 5.1% of 6.2% of 17,427. 
5 £43k from endowments ‘mainly in connection with elementary schools’ (Colebrooke Comission, 
1875, p. 239) and £137k in total (Committee of Council on Education in Scotland, 1874-5: cviii, 
including only grants to schools, not to central administration). 
6 The Argyll Commission (1864: xv) reported that the total annual income of the burgh schools (which 
were the predecessors of most of the public higher class schools in the early twentieth century) in the 
1860s was £50,000, of which £42,000 was in fees and £3,000 in endowments. See also Anderson 
(1983: 162-201). In the 1870s, the amount from endowments for the schools that were the predecessors 
of most of the older endowed schools in the early twentieth century had been around £96k (Colebrooke 
Commission, 1875: 239, combining the revenue for ‘hospital endowments’ and ‘endowments mainly in 
connection with secondary schools’). So, when state grants started to be paid, the historical legacy of 
endowments for these two groups of school was around £100k per annum. The first state grant for 
secondary education did not come till the 1890s, when it was about £15,000 annually (Anderson, 1983: 
214); by the late-1890s this annual grant was around £60,000 (Committee of Council on Education in 
Scotland, 1898-99: xxxiii). 
7 Calculated as ‘historic standard of living’ from the ‘measuring worth’ website of the Economic 
History Association (2017). The same source is used for other monetary sums below. 
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